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ethics

Corporate “Miranda”
Warnings
BY PETER A. JOY AND KEVIN C. McMUNIGAL

C

orporate wrongdoing has received great
attention during the last decade. Once
again it is at the center of national news
as President Obama and congressional leaders
debate the need for greater regulation of corporations. Internal investigations of corporations and
other organizations have accordingly been on the
rise, and both corporate and outside counsel play
important roles in such investigations. Administrative agencies and prosecutors have adopted formal
and informal measures to push corporations to establish compliance programs, to disclose wrongdoing voluntarily, and to cooperate with government
investigations, creating what some commentators
refer to as a culture of cooperation. This culture
creates complex and often ambiguous roles and
duties for corporate counsel.
Key to internal investigations are employee interviews by counsel. One court has called such interviews “a potential legal and ethical mine field.”
(In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 415 F.3d 333, 240
(4th Cir. 2005).) Employees, especially senior employees, may assume that the lawyers representing their organizational employers represent them
as well in matters relating to their work. To avoid
this misunderstanding, both in-house and outside
counsel now use “corporate Miranda warnings” or
“Upjohn warnings.” Clear warnings advise the interviewee that counsel represents the organization
and does not represent the interviewee; communications between the lawyer and the interviewee
are protected by the organization’s attorney-client
privilege and confidentiality rights; the privilege
and confidentiality rights belong to the organizaPETER A. JOY is a professor of law and
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Law in St. Louis, Missouri; he can be
reached at joy@wulaw.wustl.edu. KEVIN
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tion; and the organization, not the interviewee,
decides whether to consent to disclosure or to
waive the privilege, thereby controlling government access to information from the interview.
In law enforcement interrogation, the Miranda
warning is an antidote to the coercive effect of
a custodial setting. In a corporate internal investigation, the corporate Miranda warning is an
antidote to employee misunderstanding of the
lawyer’s role and whom the lawyer represents. In
both contexts, the warnings are safeguards for the
person being questioned against potential overreaching by the questioner.
There are competing perspectives on warnings
in internal investigations. Without a warning, the
employee is likely to be more cooperative and
help counsel uncover and remedy wrongdoing
that could otherwise injure both the organization
and the public. The lawyer’s effective representation of the organizational client is furthered when
the employee freely shares information. On the
other hand, a clear warning helps to guarantee
that the employee is not misled and advances the
legal profession’s interests in preventing the lawyer from being unfair to an unrepresented person.
A clear warning also helps prevent an employee
from later arguing that the lawyer established an
attorney-client relationship with the employee
that could trigger disqualification in any legal
matter in which the employee’s interests conflict
with the organization’s interests.
But why do corporations and their lawyers
cooperate with the government in the first place?
What ethical rules bear on conducting an internal
investigation? In this column, we explore these
and other issues concerning the use of corporate
Miranda warnings.

Why Cooperate with the Government?

The current culture of corporate cooperation
is a product of voluntary disclosure programs,
prosecutorial charging guidelines, and sentencing
guidelines, all of which reward cooperation with
either immunity from prosecution or reduced
sanctions. State and federal agencies have implemented a number of voluntary disclosure programs and have established formal cooperation
guidelines that benefit corporations and other organizations that self-police and report wrongdoing. Voluntary disclosure programs offering leniency exist in a number of areas, such as antitrust,
defense procurement, and health care, as well as
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environmental and tax law. For example, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division’s
Leniency Program promises no prosecution for
a company that is not the subject of an ongoing
investigation if the corporation is the first to selfreport illegal antitrust activity completely and
honestly, has terminated the activity upon its discovery, and cooperates fully with the government.
In some other areas, the government may stop
short of promising not to prosecute and instead
offer to consider the cooperation in determining
whether to prosecute. (See Lee Stein & Steven J.
Monde, Culture of Cooperation: Weighing Benefits and Risks, Nat’l L.J., Mar. 8, 2010, at 16.)
In addition to voluntary disclosure programs,
DOJ charging guidelines advise prosecutors to
consider, among other factors, whether a corporation has made a voluntary and timely disclosure
of wrongdoing, is willing to cooperate in the investigation, has in place an effective compliance
program, and has taken action to remediate the
wrongdoing. Federal Sentencing Guidelines also
encourage self-reporting by reducing fines for
timely and complete disclosure, cooperating with
the investigation, and accepting responsibility.
These programs and guidelines together create
and reinforce powerful incentives to cooperate to
reduce liability for wrongdoing. These incentives
also push organizations to implement ongoing
compliance programs and to engage in periodic
investigations that may put an employer’s interests at odds with an employee who may have engaged in wrongdoing. When a conflict between
the employer’s interests and the interests of an
employee occurs, the lawyers involved in the internal investigation have to be careful to demonstrate that they have clearly identified their client
and their role.
Without a warning, an employee interviewed
during an investigation may not understand the
lawyer’s role. Such an employee may assume that
the lawyer for the employer also represents the
employee and will protect the employee’s interests. Several ethics rules address this concern.

Ethical Obligations

A number of ethics rules provide guidance to
a lawyer conducting an internal investigation.
When the interests of the organization are not
adverse to those of the employee, joint representation is permitted under Model Rules 1.7 and
1.13(g) provided an appropriate representative for

the organization consents to the dual representation. The employee to be represented, however,
may not consent for the organization. While joint
representation may be attractive in some situations, often it will be difficult to ascertain at the
start of an internal investigation if the interests
of the organization and the client will eventually
conflict. For that reason, lawyers should be reluctant to recommend joint representation before
conducting initial interviews.
Because the interests of the organization may
diverge from those of the organization’s employees, the lawyer representing an organization must
be clear about whom the lawyer represents. It will
typically be clear that the lawyer represents the
organization. Where ambiguity is likely to occur
is whether the lawyer represents only the corporation. In other words, whether the lawyer jointly
represents the corporation and the employee may
often be ambiguous both in the lawyer’s mind and
in the eye of the employee. In dealing with employees, Model Rule 1.13(f) states that a lawyer
for an organization must “explain the identity of
the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know that the organization’s interests are
adverse to those of the constituents with whom
the lawyer is dealing.” While a lawyer conducting
an internal investigation may not be certain that
the employee’s interests are in conflict with those
of the organization, the lawyer will often be aware
that such a conflict may arise. This is especially
true if the internal investigation is prompted by
a suspicion that one or more employees have engaged in wrongdoing.
In addition, counsel must be careful to determine if the employee is represented by another
lawyer in the matter. An employee learning of an
internal investigation may retain a lawyer before
a scheduled interview. Model Rule 4.2, the anticontact rule, prohibits a lawyer from communicating with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter. If the
lawyer knows the employee is represented, then
the lawyer conducting the internal investigation
must have the consent of the employee’s lawyer
before conducting an interview. If during the interview the investigating lawyer learns that the
employee has counsel, the investigating lawyer
should terminate the interview until and unless
consent is obtained from the employee’s lawyer.
If the employee is not represented by counsel at
the time of the interview, the investigating lawyer
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representing the organization must comply with
ethics rules for dealing with an unrepresented person. Model Rule 4.3 requires that when “the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer’s
role in the matter,” the lawyer must “correct the
misunderstanding.” Model Rule 4.3 also prohibits
the lawyer from giving any legal advice except the
advice to secure counsel “if the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that the interests of such
person are or have a reasonable possibility of being
in conflict with the interests of the client.”

The Content of Corporate Miranda
Warnings

Unless joint representation is contemplated because the lawyer has determined that the interests of the corporation and the employee are not
likely to be adverse, a lawyer conducting an investigation should usually give an employee a corporate Miranda warning. What should the warning
include? The ethics rules are ambiguous on the
content of such a warning, as are cases dealing
with warnings.
Consider, for example, the warnings given in
In re Grand Jury Subpoena. The warnings clearly
indicated that the lawyers represented the corporation. But they were somewhat ambiguous
about whether the lawyers also represented the
employees. The warnings also explained that the
attorney-client privilege belonged to the corporation, that the corporation could decide to waive
the privilege, and that the employee had no say
over possible waiver.
The trial court found these warnings sufficient to defeat a claim that an attorney-client
relationship was formed between the investigating lawyers and the employees. (415 F.3d at 338.)
The trial court also found that the investigating
lawyers’ statements that “we can represent you as
long as no conflict appears,” read in context with
the rest of the warning, id. at 340 (emphasis in the
original), was not “sufficient to establish the reasonable understanding that they were representing” the employees. (Id. (emphasis in original).)
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, but stated that its
“opinion should not be read as an implicit acceptance of the watered-down ‘Upjohn warnings’ the
investigating attorneys” used. (Id.)
As the Fourth Circuit’s opinion indicates, an
investigating lawyer’s statements that he or she
can or could, under certain circumstances, jointly
represent the employee tread close to the line of

leading an employee to believe that the employee
is being jointly represented. The opinion suggests
that a lawyer should steer clear of suggesting the
possibility of joint representation when giving a
corporate Miranda warning.
How else might the “watered-down” warnings
found in the In re Grand Jury Subpoena case have
been made more robust? In addition to the investigating lawyer clearly stating that the lawyer does
not represent the employee, there are two additional matters the inclusion of which would have
strengthened the warnings. The first would have
been to explain that in addition to privilege, confidentiality rights are held and controlled by the
corporation alone and not the employee. Second,
the warning could have included an explanation
that should the corporation decide to cooperate
with the government the corporation could disclose the contents of the interview as part of its
cooperation.
Some may believe that any warning, much like
a Miranda warning in a criminal case, may make
the employee feel like a suspect and withhold information during the interview. But it should be
kept in mind that employees have an incentive to
cooperate with an investigation because failure to
cooperate could cost them their jobs. In addition,
employees might also be able to gain immunity
or reduced sanctions if they disclose their past
wrongdoing and cooperate with the investigation
and the government.

Consequences for Violating Ethical and
Legal Obligations

If the organization’s lawyer is found to have represented the employee as a result of the lawyer’s
statements or ambiguity created by the lawyer
during an internal investigation, significant negative consequences may follow. First, and most
likely, the employee could seek to disqualify counsel from representing the organization should the
organization and employee take conflicting positions in the matter. If the lawyer is disqualified,
the conflict would be imputed to all other lawyers
in the firm.
If a court decides the lawyer jointly represented the employee and the organization, then
the employee and the organization would jointly
hold confidentiality rights and the attorney-client
privilege. Instead of the organization exercising
exclusive control over consenting to disclosure
and waiving privilege to cooperate with the gov-

Published in Criminal Justice, Volume 25, Number 2, Summer 2010. © 2010 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All
rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic
database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.

ernment, the employee could refuse to consent
to disclosure and refuse to waive work-product
protection and attorney-client privilege relating
to information counsel collected, thereby hampering the organization’s ability to cooperate with
the government.
The employee could also file an ethics complaint against the lawyer alleging breach of the
duties of loyalty and confidentiality as well as
conflict of interest. Allegations may also include
violations of other ethics rules discussed previously, depending on the circumstances of the
investigatory interview. If disciplinary authorities find that the complaint has merit, the lawyer
could face professional discipline. In addition to
the possibilities of disqualification and professional discipline, a lawyer who states or implies
that the employee as well as the organization is
the lawyer’s client may face malpractice liability.
Liability could be found if the lawyer harms the
employee by breaching the duties of loyalty and
confidentiality by turning over the contents of the
interview to the government. If the lawyer is outside counsel, there is also the possibility that the
organization may initiate a malpractice action.

If there isn’t a record of what the lawyer stated
to the employee during the interview, it may be
hard for the lawyer to prove that an attorney-client relationship did not exist. While some courts
are skeptical of such claims, especially when disqualification is sought, failing to give a warning
to an employee before conducting an internal investigatory interview carries potential risks.

Conclusion

Counsel conducting an internal investigation for
a corporate client faces a difficult task of balancing the need to obtain cooperation from employees and maximize access to information against
the danger of misleading employees about counsel’s role. To avoid misunderstanding and possible
disqualification, a lawyer should give a warning
to each employee at the start of the interview and
memorialize the warning. While such warnings
may cause some employees to withhold information, they ensure that employees understand that
the lawyer does not represent them and that the
organizational client controls the disclosure of
information. n

Published in Criminal Justice, Volume 25, Number 2, Summer 2010. © 2010 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All
rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic
database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.

